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Abstract 
This paper identifies and analyses the use of social media by the British National Party (BNP) – a far-right 
party based in the UK. The analysis centres on changing forms of political participation, suggesting that the 
BNP, as well as other political parties both on the far-right and in the political mainstream, are using social 
media to provide the opportunity for casual or even accidental engagement by sharing or engaging with 
material over social networks. To illustrate this point, the author draws on an extensive sample of visual 
material posted by the BNP on the social network Facebook. Engaging with material produced by far-right 
groups such as the BNP potentially opens audience members up to a number of personal, professional and 
legal risks. The paper concludes by linking the potential for casual or accidental far-right engagement 




The question of who involves themselves with far-
right groups and why remains relatively open 
(Goodwin, 2010). Academic consensus has been 
slow to form, with competing explanations 
embracing the impact of aspects as diverse as 
psychological factors, (Fromm, 1942; Adorno et al, 
1950), social and economic circumstance (Billig, 
1978), life history, and ideological factors 
(Goodwin, 2010).  
 
While the approaches and focusses adopted by 
different studies have varied enormously, an 
important unifying aspect may be found in the 
assumptions made about the nature of 
engagement with far-right organisations, and in 
particular in the focus on individuals considered 
‘members’ or ‘activists’ of extreme groups. In 
general, qualitative analyses of the British far-right 
have focussed on those who participate formally at 
the expense of other categories of involvement and 
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support. Billig’s (1978) seminal study of the 
National Front, for example, used evidence 
gathered through semi-structured interviews with 
members, while Goodwin’s (2010: 34-5) major 
work on the British National Party (BNP) relied 
heavily on interviews with ‘activists’. Similarly, 
quantitative studies attempting to isolate 
predictors of extreme right support have often also 
relied on analyses that require participants to self-
identify as supporters of members of extreme-right 
parties (Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, 2011; Ford & 
Goodwin, 2010).  
 
Recent research has, however, highlighted the 
importance of questions of belonging and identity 
to the study of the far-right, challenging traditional 
notions of ‘membership’ and ‘activism’ in favour of 
a more nuanced understanding of participation 
that transcends traditional categories to 
accommodate more fluid modes of  participation. It 
thus remains to be seen how the traditional 
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categories employed in much of the existing 
literature can be utilised to help understand both 
the proliferation of new political actors (Bartlett, 
Birdwell and Littler, 2011) and shifts in modes of 
engagement by existing political groups.  
Indeed, research on the English Defence League (a 
social movement rather than a political party) 
highlights the complexity of determining who 
belongs to a movement and who is merely claiming 
membership for effect (Bartlett and Littler, 2011), a 
point lent further credibility by research exploring 
youths chanting EDL slogans - very few, if any, of 
whom were found to be involved in the group 
(Busher, 2012). 
 
Membership and Online Activism 
Assuming formal membership or engagement as a 
basis for analysis is therefore hugely problematic: it 
ignores the growing repertoire of casual political 
action available to parties and other political 
groups and their supporters, and the important 
ways in which the growth of new communication 
technologies has shifted norms of political 
engagement. In an increasingly online world, what 
constitutes activism or membership has become 
harder to define, often falling short of the formal 
membership that has been the focus of much of 
the existing literature on the far-right. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that membership of political 
parties and strength of party affiliation is in long 
term decline across the West (Keen, 2015), and 
that the role of members is therefore increasingly 
symbolic (Stoker, 2006). For young people in 
particular, formalised electoral politics is often 
critiqued as alienating, and a lack of engagement 
seen as symptomatic not of a lack of interest in 
politics, but of a rejection of formal and partisan 
participatory modes (Sloam, 2007 see also 
Quintelier, 2007 and Keen, 2015).  
 
There are numerous explanations for this 
widespread decline in political parties as formalised 
membership organisations, with several theoretical 
models of party organisation that attempt to 
compensate for this decline in traditional mass 
party organisations - for example, Kircheimmer’s 
‘catch-all party’ (1966), Panebianco’s Electoral-
professional model (1988) and Katz and Mair’s 
cartel model (1995). The role of technology has 
equally attracted academic attention as a way of 
reconciling declining citizen involvement with 
parties and their continued pre-eminence in the UK 
system. In response to the push factors created by 
declining involvement, some have suggested new 
organisational forms entirely supported by 
symbolic party engagement through technology 
(Margetts, 2001), while others have adapted 
existing party forms (Lofgren & Smith, 2003) to 
encompass the availability of new and less 
formalised modes of digital participation within 
existing party strategies.  
 
In all cases, however, political parties and academic 
scholarship have struggled to understand the costs 
and benefits of these shifts in participation norms, 
with any possible benefits balanced against 
concerns around ‘slacktivism’ and ‘clicktivism’, 
where online participation may be seen to reduce 
the chances of offline engagement (Butler, 2011). 
As a result, significant attention has been paid to 
the impact of different types of online political 
engagement, and the relative costs and benefits of 
different online tools. 
 
Online Political Engagement in the UK 
Early efforts at online political engagement in the 
UK were regarded as poor (Chadwick, 2006), and 
even contemporary online engagement is often 
seen as cursory and lacking interactivity (Southern, 
2014; Lee, 2014). However, analysis is beginning to 
identify some evidence of purposeful strategy in UK 
web campaigning, particularly in the wake of the 
2012 Obama campaign. Lilleker and Jackson (2013) 
highlight the important distinction between 
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external and internal marketing, suggesting that 
during the 2012 campaign web presence was an 
important tool for reaching out to and mobilising 
supporters. Further in support of the idea of the 
web, and social media in particular, as a potential 
substitute for crumbling traditional party structures 
a recent report highlighted the growth of 
mainstream political parties’ virtual followings on 
popular social media tools in the UK, going so far as 
to suggest that such people were ‘virtually 
members’ (Bartlett et al, 2013).  
 
The exact role of online supporters of parties thus 
remains unclear. Many parties appear to be 
attempting to leverage their online followings in a 
number of ways, with one prominent example 
being viral advertising. Viral advertising refers to 
the potential for the exponential spread of content 
through online networks as users forward 
messages to one another (Phelps, et al, 2004; 
Golan & Zaidner, 2008; Swanepoel, et al, 2009; 
Hinz, et al, 2011). Most typically this takes the form 
of images designed to be shared by online 
supporters. A forthcoming study based on the run 
up to the 2015 general election in the UK found 
that collectively the seven largest parties in the UK 
posted 2447 of these online political posters (OPPs) 
on the social network Facebook between 
September 2013 and May 2015 (Lee & Campbell, 
2015). OPPs closely resembled conventional 
posters in some ways, juxtaposing images and text 
to convey a political message. However, they 
differed in some key respects, being on the whole 
less sophisticated than conventional political 
posters, far more numerous and, as they could be 
produced within a narrow timescale, more topical. 
The aims of viral advertising for political parties in 
this way are less clear. In the first instance OPPs 
seem designed to be distributed widely and contain 
appeals for users to ‘like’ and ‘share’ content, 
capitalising on the potential of social networks such 
as Facebook to act as catalysts for accidental 
exposure to political material even amongst 
apolitical users (Chadwick, 2009; Lee & Campbell, 
2015). The empirical reality suggested, however, 
that most of the OPPs produced remained within a 
political echo chamber, and despite a few strong 
performers, were rarely shared more than a few 
thousand times (Lee & Campbell, 2015; see also 
Sunstein 2007).  
 
The BNP and viral advertising 
Returning to far-right politics, despite a disastrous 
showing in the 2014 European elections and the 
2015 general election, and a change in leadership, 
the British National Party remains the most 
prominent – and visible - far-right political party in 
the UK. However, important questions may be 
asked around the BNP’s political (and 
organisational) collapse and the impact this has had 
on its position in the broader milieu of far-right 
politics in the UK. In terms of online presence and 
viral advertising on social media, alternative groups 
– for example, the EDL, Infidels, and Britain First (a 
BNP offshoot) - have all had arguably greater 
success in establishing their presence on platforms 
such as Facebook (often by inducing users to ‘like’ 
and ‘share’ posts that address non-right wing issues 
– for example, opposing animal cruelty - without 
being aware of the party’s political ideology).  
 
Despite this, the BNP continues to take its online 
offering very seriously maintaining an active 
website and a managed presences on a series of 
social media platforms. Most analysis of the BNP’s 
web presence has centred on the content and 
narrative (Atton, 2006; Wood and Finlay, 2008) 
although there has been some consideration of the 
role of the web in developing new recruits 
(Goodwin, 2010). The BNP shares the same 
organisational incentives as any other UK political 
party to incorporate online tools into its 
communication mix. However, the fringe status of 
the BNP also provides some unique reasons for it to 
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use online tools, allowing the BNP to expand its 
reach despite its small size, circumvent (to some 
extent) mainstream media lock out, and to allow its 
supporters to participate with some degree of 
anonymity (Whine, 1999; Virchow, 2004; Bratten, 
2005; Caiani & Wagemann, 2009).  
 
As with mainstream political parties, the BNP also 
produces online political posters and distributes 
them through social media, particularly Facebook. 
This paper is an attempt to explore its usage of this 
medium, examining its use of online political 
posters over a 21 month period. 
 
Method  
This paper is based on observations from a dataset 
of OPPs produced by the BNP between 12th 
September 2013 and 8th May 2015. The main 
Facebook page of the BNP2 was observed on a daily 
basis and any OPPs that were posted were 
downloaded by the researcher. In addition, a note 
was made of the number of times an image was 
liked, shared, and when available, commented 
upon.3 In order to allow likes and shares to 
accumulate, data was collected retrospectively, 
three days after the original posting. Between 
September 2013 and May 2015 the BNP produced 
1122 OPPs. As a point of comparison, the Labour 
party, the most prolific user of OPPs among 
mainstream parties produced 888 OPPs within the 
same time period (Campbell & Lee, 2015). Not of all 
the OPPs were original and this figure includes 
OPPs that were posted multiple times by the BNP 
as well as slight reconfigurations of older images, 
e.g. changes to text. 
 
Results  
A review of this data highlights a number of key 
trends in the BNP’s use of OPPs. BNP OPPs are 
seemingly explicitly designed to be shared by users 
2 The main Facebook page of the BNP can found at: https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritishNationalParty?fref=ts  
3 A change to the way Facebook works meant that the total number of comments was not displayed in many cases 
after April 2015.  
on social media. In the early portion of the dataset 
(between 13th September 2013 and 22nd November 
2013) explicit requests for users to share or like an 
image were absent from the majority of BNP 
images. From the 22nd of November 2013 onwards, 
however, requests for users to ‘share and like if you 
agree’ become far more common and are featured 
in the majority of images. Of the 1052 images 
metadata was available for, the mean number of 
times an image was shared was 1014.8. It should 
be noted that the distributions of likes and shares 
were both highly skewed with a small number of 
high-performing images increasing the overall 
mean drastically, the median number of likes was 
802 and median shares was 417.5. Cumulatively, 
BNP OPPs were shared 1,066,812 times during the 
analysis period. BNP OPPs were liked an average of 
3624.01 times and accumulated a total of 
3,812,461 likes in the analysis period. These should 
be seen in the context of the unknown Facebook 
audience but it is likely that the same audience 
members were repeatedly sharing content. 
  
Common topics referenced in BNP OPPs included 
immigration (Muslim immigration and social issues 
in particular) and the ineptitude of the current 
political establishment. This combination of the 
hostile other and the incompetent or sinister elite 
is in keeping with established research on the 
BNP’s political narrative as well as with populist 
mobilisations in general (Halikiopoulou & 
Vasilopoulou, 2010, Atton, 2006; Canovan, 1981). 
Image one [see appendix] combines most of these 
narratives in a single image. It includes an 
unflattering picture of current UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron looking confused and uncertain. 
Next to this image is an icon representing the 
messaging application WhatsApp. The text next to 
the image is in quotation marks saying “If I’m re-
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elected I’ll ban WhatsApp in Britain because 
terrorists are using it.” This refers to a speech made 
by David Cameron on the 12th of January 2015 in 
which he problematized and hinted at a ban on the 
use of encrypted communications applications (The 
Independent, 2015; TechDirt, 2015). Although 
media reporting around the issue specifically 
mentioned WhatsApp (among other applications) 
this was not mentioned in the Prime Minister’s 
Speech. Equally, no reference to the text presented 
by the BNP as a quote can be found. The BNP then 
pivots the message suggesting that they would 
prevent ‘Islamist jihadis’ from ‘re-entering’ the 
country, a reference to the current concern over 
the rise of the self-described Islamic State, and that 
they would deport terrorist ‘suspects’, although it is 
not made clear where they would be deported to 
or on what legal basis. In the final sentence, this 
argument is linked to protecting the ‘ordinary 
people’ of the UK from both an overly intrusive 
government and terrorism. Aside from combination 
of messages in a relatively succinct way, this image 
stands out for its timeliness. The speech was 
reported on 12th of January and the BNP was able 
to create and publish a response within the day.  
 
More concerning is the ability of the BNP to engage 
on topics not obviously related to a far-right 
agenda and without explicitly identifying the origin 
of communication. Image two shows an attempt by 
the BNP to mobilise support around the issue of 
energy prices in the winter of 2013. The focus on 
energy prices coincides with a Labour pre-election 
pledge to freeze energy prices (BBC, 2013). The 
BNP has converted the message to a more hostile 
form, attacking British Gas rather than pledging a 
freeze, the message nonetheless seems calculated 
to capitalise on the wider public debate. The BNP 
also frequently attempts to co-opt existing figures, 
both contemporary and historical, into its 
movement. Presented as endorsements, these 
OPPs typically featured and image of the individual 
and a quotation seen as broadly supportive of the 
BNP’s agenda. The dataset includes OPPs that 
feature Morrissey (25th January 2015), Prince 
Charles (16th February 2015, image three) and 
Roger Daltrey (5th April 2015). The BNP also ran a 
Great Britons series in which they included 
historical figures such as Bernard Montgomery 
(17th November 2014), Agatha Christie (15th 
September 2014), Alexander Fleming (6th August 
2014) and Emmeline Pankhurst (15th July 2014). 
The presentation of these images differed in that 
BNP branding was less explicit in the image, 
confined typically to a detail in the ‘o’ of ‘Great 
Briton’. 
 
The lack of explicit branding was also a feature of 
other BNP OPPs. For example, an OPP (image four) 
posted by the BNP on the 12th of January 2015 
attempted to capitalise on recent news stories 
centred on the performance of the NHS in the run 
up to the 2015 election. Both Labour and the 
Conservatives are represented as being equally 
inept and unable to fix the crisis. The party name or 
any identifiable BNP branding does not appear 
anywhere on the image. In some cases, for example 
on a mobile device or when sharing images that 
have already been reposted by friends, it may be 
harder for users to realise what they are sharing 
and who created it.  
 
In addition to the images themselves, BNP OPPs 
also became a focal point for comments by users. 
Often these comment sections would begin by 
referencing the image but in some cases users 
would later begin to respond to one another. One 
exchange demonstrates the capacity for these 
debates to descend into extreme rhetoric. The 
following occurred in response to a BNP OPP 
published on the 26th July 2015. The OPP featured a 
comparison of two quotes, one from David 
Cameron saying ‘I want an Asian Prime Minister of 
Great Britain’ and a second from BNP Leader Adam 
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Walker saying ‘We need politicians who represent 
the British people.’ One section of the resulting 
comment thread is reproduced below: 
A: ‘Cameron is brainwashed by the muslim 
believe he has become a traitor to Britain, 
and by the way there isn't a good muslim’ 
B: ‘Oh yeah and how many Muslims do you 
know?’ 
C: ‘[User A]...The Only 'good' moslum is a 
Dead One..!!’  
Exchange in BNP comment thread on 
Facebook 26th July 2015 
 
The exchange is interesting in several ways. First, 
the original OPP made no reference to Muslims or 
Islam, and in fact only referenced Asian ethnicity. 
User A is not alone in this comment section in 
assuming a universal equivalency between Asian 
and Muslim. Collectively the comments have 
departed considerably from the original message. 
Second, despite the presence of a counter 
narrative, this was not addressed within this 
specific thread, although other comments from 
User B were challenged by others where he was 
seen as a ‘troll’. Finally, users were able to descend 
from paranoia and xenophobia to extremist and 
potentially violent rhetoric relatively quickly and 
without being challenged.  
 
Consequences and policy implications 
In terms of electoral support or social cohesion, the 
impact of viral advertising by the BNP is not clear. 
In keeping with wider studies of propaganda and 
advertising, measuring the direct effect of 
messages is difficult given the issues of validity 
associated with both survey and experimental 
approaches (Kaid, 2012: 41-42). These issues are 
further compounded when considering the small 
numbers involved in far-right politics and the 
ethical dimension in creating any artificial 
experiment around these issues. More generally, 
the effectiveness of online activism of this type for 
bringing about real political change has been 
openly questioned on the grounds that it compares 
poorly to more costly forms of political 
engagement (Gladwell, 2010). In the case of OPPs, 
the lack of concrete electoral effects should be 
balanced against the more indirect effects of 
building an online brand. In addition to directly 
mobilising support, spreading messages online 
enhances the prestige and credibility of an 
organisation and provides established online 
supporters that lack any physical connection to 
each other or the party with a common frame of 
reference (Lee & Campbell, 2015).  
 
More pressing than any immediate political impact, 
however, is the potential for OPPs produced by the 
BNP and other far-right groups to provide a 
pathway to low-level political participation in far-
right politics. Engaging with this material by 
sharing, liking or commenting on it may open up 
participants to unforeseen risks socially, 
professionally and in some cases legally. 
Engagement can be intentional and a reflection of 
an individual’s own political views. In some cases 
engagement with BNP content is likely to be 
unintentional with users unaware of where the 
content they are sharing originates as a result of 
either a lack of care or a lack of understanding. The 
use of unbranded and politically ambiguous 
content by the BNP seems designed to exploit the 
potential for unintended engagement. Although 
unintended engagement is unlikely to begin a chain 
reaction that ultimately leads a user to join the 
BNP, the BNP still benefits from the greater 
organisational credibility online and wider message 
dissemination.  
 
The social and political risks of participation are 
clear and immediate. In addition to the general 
risks that online behaviours pose in terms of the 
promotion of intolerance and degradation of social 
cohesion – including, potentially, to ‘cumulative 
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extremism’ (Feldman and Littler, 2015) – the 
distribution online of far-right content may do 
much to bring extreme concerns to the attention of 
the wide public. This has the potential – for 
example, with concerns around immigration and 
radical Islam – to feed in to (and harden) more 
‘mainstream’ concerns around these issues, 
potentially helping to build moral panic (Cohen, 
1972). More than this, the use of OPPs (and online 
activism more broadly) may help far-right groups to 
appear a more significant force than, in reality, they 
are, with potentially serious consequences in terms 
of the state response. 
 
At an individual level, as acts carried out on social 
media are public (even though they can be difficult 
to identify), sharing or endorsing content from the 
BNP or another far-right group, even inadvertently, 
may provoke a reaction from friends and family. 
Similar risks apply professionally, with some 
employers now using social media to check up on 
the character of potential employees (Smith & 
Kidder, 2010). Social networks are also becoming 
an important component in professional working, 
potentially blurring the line between the personal 
and professional, combining worlds that even a few 
years previously could have been comfortably 
separated (Sánchez Abril et al, 2012). Membership 
of groups such as the BNP is outright forbidden in 
some professions: for example, there is a ban on 
BNP membership in both the Police and Prison 
Service (Guardian, 2008). In addition, membership 
of the BNP has been seen as problematic in other 
professions such as Teaching (Telegraph, 2010). It is 
not clear how these policies and prejudices will 
translate to this kind of low-resource engagement. 
 
4 In 1998 Nick Griffin and Paul Ballard, both members of the BNP were convicted of distributing material likely to incite 
racial hatred as a result of an article written in The Rune. In 2004 then BNP Leader Griffin, as well as prominent 
member and founder John Tyndall and several others were arrested on suspicion of inciting racial hatred as the result 
of the ITV documentary The Secret Agent. Griffin and activist Mark Collett were cleared of all charges following a 
retrial in 2006.    
In addition to the social and professional risks 
presented by these behaviours, there is also a 
potential legal risk. Despite the existence of 
legislation, there is little evidence that casual 
engagement with the BNP online has resulted in 
prosecutions on these grounds, although there 
have been cases brought against prominent 
individuals within the BNP.4 Both the legal and 
social risks to the individual are heightened by the 
existence of ‘obstructive’ campaign groups 
designed to collate hate crime instances, websites 
and individuals, or highlight content classified as 
racist (Titley et al, 2014: 45-46 and 74). These risks 
are also further emphasised by the fact that there 
is little current understanding of the audience for 
the BNP on Facebook. Although analysis of BNP 
support through survey instruments has suggested 
that BNP support is concentrated in over 35s (Ford 
& Goodwin, 2010), analysis of those that follow the 
group on Facebook has suggested that on social 
media those following the group were likely 
younger (Bartlett, et al, 2011). Immature audiences 
are potentially less aware of the risks involved with 
engaging with BNP content, and are potentially 
more likely to incautious in engaging with content 
second hand.  
   
There remains the question of formulating an 
appropriate policy response to the question of far-
right viral advertising online in the UK. Avenues to 
deal with this are split mainly between suppression 
of the BNP and those posting its content, and 
awareness-building.  Legally there may be a case to 
restrict the BNP’s use of Facebook to disseminate 
messages where messages transgress UK law. 
However, there has been little sign of interest in 
attempting to limit the BNP’s activities on social 
media. This may in part be down to legislation that 
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requires that material was intended to or was likely 
in the circumstances to stir up racial hatred, or, in 
the case of religious hatred only if a person intends 
to stir up religious hatred (Crown Prosecution 
Service, undated). This may also be a result of the 
complexities of enforcing laws online, in particular 
where jurisdictional issues may confuse matters. 
The protection granted by the US First Amendment 
is noted as presenting a particular difficulty for 
tackling hate speech online (Banks, 2010). An 
alternative approach might be to act on service 
providers themselves (ibid). Facebook, for example, 
is under no obligation to provide the BNP with a 
platform and can withdraw services if it chooses to 
do so.  
 
However, any attempt to supress the BNP’s online 
activities should be viewed with caution and may 
ultimately be counter-productive. The BNP’s belief 
in its own persecution by both media and political 
establishment would only be exacerbated and 
perhaps to some extent justified as a result of legal 
action, or action taken by a service provider. In 
addition, the BNP is a legitimately constituted 
political party and one registered with the UK 
Electoral Commission, and the current Crown 
Prosecution Service guidance emphasises the 
importance of protecting a ‘robust exchange of 
views’ (Crown Prosecution Service, undated). 
As a result of the difficulty and undesirability of 
suppression, a second policy approach relies on 
developing awareness of the issues posed by the 
use of social media by groups such as the BNP. 
There is much work underway in this area already, 
and a recent Council of Europe Report (Titley et al, 
2014: 41-44; see also UNESCO’s 2015 report) 
highlights a number of organisations engaging in 
work in particular with young people to educate 
them about basic concepts such as stereotyping. 
Within the UK, groups such as Show Racism the 
Red Card and Stonewall also work with young 
people. However, these projects are piecemeal and 
there is seemingly little space to incorporate this 
type of work into statutory curricula. In the UK the 
National Curriculum, and in particular Citizenship 
Education is a historical and contemporary site of 
struggle (Carr, 1991; Guardian, 2015). The most 
recent iteration does include a reference to ‘the 
need for mutual respect and understanding’ at Key 
Stage Four (14-16) but does not emphasise the sort 
of technical and critical skills need for a broader 
‘Digital Citizenship’ (Gagliardone et al 2015). 
 
Conclusions 
This has been a far-ranging paper, but hopefully 
one that has illustrated how some far-right 
organisations are changing and taking advantage of 
new forms of political participation. Whereas in the 
past membership or formal electoral support may 
have been the benchmark for involvement in far-
right politics, the arrival of the web and social 
media in particular has opened up the potential for 
online audiences to participate either casually or 
accidentally. Based on an extensive sample of 
images collected from the social network Facebook 
it has become clear that the BNP has exploited this 
potential, condensing much of its message down to 
easily sharable poster-style images. The BNP has 
also attempted to mobilise around mainstream 
issues such as energy prices, co-opt historical 
figures and celebrities, and in some instances 
remove its own branding on political 
advertisements.  
 
The immediate electoral consequences of this form 
of mobilisation are likely minimal. However, the 
social, political, and legal consequences of these 
behaviours are of greater concern, in particular 
where audience members are likely to be younger 
and potentially politically naïve or lacking in the 
media literacy skills required to fully understand 
the production of political messages over social 
networks. Although there are various avenues to 
address and supress these types of behaviour, both 
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legal and extra-legal, these may be counter-
productive. Instead, these behaviours further add 
weight to calls to develop and teach the skills 
required for young people in particular to act as 
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